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Abstract 
 This paper uses Poisson and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
techniques on panel data from the United Nations World Health Organization’s 
FluNet to evaluate factors contributing to a country’s H1N1 influenza (swine flu) 
pandemic outcomes. Countries with higher development (as measured by gross 
domestic product and the United Nations Human Development Program’s 
development index) and higher mean annual temperature (as measured in the 
capital city) tended to have an earlier first reporting of cases. Though subject to 
reporting biases, the results also suggest that mass vaccinations have a negative 
effect on weekly reported cases. Countries that would vaccinate in the future 
(after the vaccine was developed) had on average six times the weekly case 
reports of countries that wouldn’t vaccinate. Other policies tested (thermal 
scanners at entry points, flight bans, and pork bans) showed no consistent 
negative result. 
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................2 
PREFACE........................................................................................................................................3 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................6 
II. KEY FACTORS.........................................................................................................................9 
III. DATA DESCRIPTION..........................................................................................................12 
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY .................................................................................................15 
V. RESULTS .................................................................................................................................18 
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................24 
CITATIONS ..................................................................................................................................25 
TABLES AND FIGURES ......................................................................................................... A-1 
HONORS SUMMARY.............................................................................................................. H-1 
 3 
Preface
 In the fall of 2010, I spent the semester studying in London. Over the 
summer, I had heard about “swine flu” and had even seen a few reports of it 
locally. Once I arrived in London, I was surrounded by National Health Service 
advertisements to “Catch It, Bin It, Kill It.” One of my flatmates was diagnosed 
with H1N1, and all of us came down with some form of it. Our school handed out 
hand sanitizer; our landlord came through with sanitizing wipes, twice-weekly 
cleanings, and extra tissues. Yet when I returned to the U.S. in the spring, I heard 
little of the virus. Syracuse University offered the vaccine once it was available, 
and had installed hand sanitizer dispensers across campus, but outside of our 
campus bubble, there was little apparent campaigning against the virus. I was 
intrigued by these regional differences, and was eager to learn more about the 
variation in pandemic approaches. 
 Dr. Christopher Rohlfs of the Economics Department helped me develop 
my interest in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic into a researchable question—how did 
countries attempt to prevent, contain, and treat H1N1, and what factors influenced 
their pandemic experience? 
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Advice 
For an Honors student, completing a Capstone seems the logical step 
senior year. But in reality, it should start so much earlier than that. Theoretically, I 
started working on my Capstone when I took econometrics my sophomore year, 
because the use of STATA has been invaluable to the many iterations of my 
project. Learning how to use the “tools of the trade” should definitely begin 
before your Capstone—I wish I had also learned GIS, but by senior year, it was 
too late. A few bits of advice, so you don’t repeat my mistakes: 
• Choose a topic you love. This will be at least six credits’ worth of your 
time senior year—you want to enjoy it. 
• Find the experts in your topic, and talk to them early on. If your thesis is 
multidisciplinary, it’s helpful to have to talk it over with people from 
multiple departments, as they can bring different perspectives to the table. 
• Do your best to make the inevitable catastrophic problem happen during 
your first semester…or else you’ll end up working on your Capstone 
during spring break. 
• When the inevitable catastrophic problem happens, don’t lose hope. 
You’ve put several months’ worth of work into this, and there’s still a 
project there. You just need to find it. 
• Reward yourself! It’s a lot of work, but definitely worth the effort. 
Milestones give you a sense of accomplishment, and finishing is the best 
of all.
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I. Introduction 
Dr. John Snow is often lauded as one of the founding fathers of 
epidemiology. Dr. Snow traced cholera through London’s water supply, and was 
able to pinpoint the pump spreading the disease. Since his time, government 
officials and scientists have tried to protect society from disease, focusing on 
identifying threats, containing them, calculating a response, and preventing future 
outbreaks. The H1N1 pandemic is now in the final stage of this process, with the 
vaccine being incorporated into the seasonal flu vaccine. 
However, little research has been conducted on the different pandemic 
experiences of infected nations, and the effectiveness of the policies implemented 
during the pandemic. While some analysis of pandemic preparedness plans has 
been performed (“HHS…,” “National…”) few studies have evaluated the 
treatment effects of pandemic interventions. In 2009, during the height of the 
pandemic, the World Bank announced that global pandemics like the H1N1 
pandemic can shave off up to 1% of an affected nation’s GDP, making pandemic 
preparedness of paramount importance (“The cost…”).  Oxford Economics 
estimated in 2009 that the pandemic would cause the world GDP to be cut by 
approximately 2.5 trillion dollars (“Impact of…”). 
Yet H1N1 fell short of predictions. As illustrated in Table 1, the pandemic 
caused approximately 14,300 recorded deaths around the world, compared to one 
million in the H3N2 pandemic in 1968-9, and two million in the H2N2 pandemic 
in 1956-8. H1N1 did surpass the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) pandemic, which caused 916 deaths. However, the pandemic still caused 
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economic woes from decreased productivity in the workplace, air travel effects, 
and impacts on agricultural trade.  
Dame Deirdre Hine believes that though the pandemic prevention 
techniques employed were based upon more dire estimates, the preparation is 
worthwhile for its applicability in other pandemic situations (Hine).  Hine 
estimates that the United Kingdom spent 1.2 billion pounds (about two billion 
dollars) on pandemic preparedness and response, including vaccines, antiviral 
drugs, communications, and stockpiling for future pandemics. Slightly less than 
half of this amount was spent on responding to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
specifically.  ABC News estimates a much lower cost of response in Australia, 
approximately 200 million dollars (“$200…).  The United States Congress 
appropriated nearly eight billion dollars to combat the pandemic, including the 
cost of preparedness planning for government and school officials (Amico). 
There is a wide range of policies available to a government hoping to 
contain a pandemic, ranging from the cancellation of social events to the 
imposition of martial law. This paper will focus on four such policies: restricting 
the import of pork from nations reporting H1N1, restricting flights to and from 
infected nations, using infrared scanning to determine elevated body temperatures 
of those entering a nation, and vaccinating the population of a nation. 
Of the 88 nations included in this study (selected for the presence of H1N1 
and consistent availability of baseline data), 11 imposed restrictions on the import 
of pork, 19 restricted air travel, 34 used infrared scanning, and to date, 55 nations 
have implemented mass-vaccination campaigns.  
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This paper uses both Poisson and multiple regression modeling to estimate 
the impact of each policy, in combination with the other three policies and with 
baseline controls for demographics, time trends, and a country’s previously 
demonstrated susceptibility to influenza. A time series analysis, looking at the 
pattern of new cases before and after each policy is enacted, and a binary analysis, 
looking at new cases once the policy is in effect, are both included in the model. 
Initial findings suggest that vaccination has a reductive effect on weekly 
H1N1 cases in both OLS and Poisson models.  Vaccination timing varied among 
nations, with the most developed countries vaccination in early November of 
2009, and less developed countries vaccinating by January of 2010.  Thermal 
scanning, pork bans, and flight bans were implemented by the spring of 2009, but 
these policies have no reductive effects in the preferred specification of the OLS 
and Poisson models.  Countries in warmer climates, with more tourism, and with 
higher populations tended to have more weekly cases of H1N1.  Countries with 
higher levels of development and tourism also tended to have an earlier start to 
the pandemic.  Comparing the pandemic and post-pandemic periods (using the 
August 10th date announced by WHO), most subgroups experienced a 60% 
decline in weekly cases. However, North America and South America 
experienced much steeper declines in weekly cases, while European countries 
maintained caseloads only slightly decreased from pandemic levels. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction is a 
description of the key factors and data, and then the estimation strategies in 
Section III. Section IV details the results of each model, and Section V concludes.  
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II. Key Factors 
Subtype A H1N1 influenza, or “swine flu,” is a form of viral respiratory 
illness traditionally found in pigs and pig farmers. In general, the strain endemic 
to pigs cannot be transmitted by human-to-human contact. However, in April of 
2009, a strain of H1N1 influenza capable of human-to-human transmission 
emerged in Mexico. Infections with the same viral sequence were then found in 
San Diego, California and Guadalupe County, Texas, and the pandemic spread to 
the rest of the United States and Canada (CDC briefing) (Panel A of Figure 1).  
The virus spread next to the United Kingdom and parts of Asia, and by 
late May it had reached South America, most of Europe, Australia, and one 
country in Africa. By September 2009, countries in North and South America 
were seeing significant death tolls (more than 100), and Western Africa was 
among the few remaining regions without reported cases (Panel B of Figure 1). 
That month, the H1N1 vaccine finished development and October of 2009 saw 
mass vaccinations in many countries. 
By the end of January 2010, death tolls in Europe and Asia had also 
climbed, and almost all countries in Africa had reported cases of H1N1 (Panel C 
of Figure 1). On August 10, 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared an end to the official H1N1 pandemic, stating that they expected to see 
H1N1 circulate like a seasonal influenza strain. WHO also cited “herd immunity” 
from widespread infection and vaccination as reason for the decline in virus 
activity (WHO August PR). Indeed, little change in total deaths and new 
infections is seen between Panels C and D of Figure 1. 
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When news of the virus in Mexico and the United States first emerged, 
some nations chose to ban imports of pork and pork products from these or all 
nations. However, there is no scientific connection between consumption of pork 
and infection with H1N1. The virus is believed to be transmitted in the same way 
as other influenza viruses—by direct contact with respiratory droplets from 
coughing or sneezing (BBC Q&A). Countries enacting this policy did so within 
the first month of the virus’s emergence. 
Some nations chose to ban air travel to and from countries reporting H1N1 
infections. Research by the Children’s Hospital Boston suggests that air travel 
restrictions may be effective in delaying the regular influenza season (“A public 
health…”). Countries choosing this policy also enacted it within the first month of 
the virus’s emergence. 
Some nations installed thermal imaging cameras at major travel 
checkpoints (airports, seaports, etc). Thermal imaging cameras use infrared 
technology to monitor the body temperature of groups of people entering a 
checkpoint. Those with temperatures above the regional norm are pulled aside for 
additional monitoring, as an elevated body temperature suggests fever, a symptom 
of influenza. Countries using thermal imaging implemented the system by the 
second month of the pandemic. 
Once the vaccine was developed, some nations implemented mass 
vaccination campaigns to provide the vaccine to their citizens. While some 
nations vaccinated “priority” groups first, such as health care workers, the dates 
used in this paper are those for the general vaccination open to the entire public. 
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However, this paper discusses the provision of vaccines only—as detailed 
vaccination rates were not available, this paper tests the effects of making 
vaccines available, rather than their use. The vaccine was not developed until 
September of 2009, and some nations did not conduct vaccination campaigns until 
February of 2010. 
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III. Data Description 
 Two main dependent variables are used in this paper—weekly H1N1 case 
totals as reported to the United Nations through the World Health Organization’s 
FluNet program, and the start week of the pandemic for each country, designated 
by the first week in which H1N1 cases were reported through FluNet.  
Country-specific characteristics are also included in the dataset, 
accounting for demographic, geographic, and epidemiological factors.  
Demographic data include each country’s population, gross domestic product, 
annual international visitors, and development ranking by the United Nations 
Development Program.  Dummy variables for each country’s continent are also 
included to account for regional interaction. To adjust for baseline cultural 
differences influencing general disease susceptibility (social kissing, personal 
distance, etc), total annual seasonal influenza cases are also included.  As these 
data are reported to the United Nations FluNet, they are presumably subject to the 
same reporting biases as the H1N1 pandemic data. 
Four policies are also included in the data set—the use of thermal scanners 
at entry points, the ban of flights to and from infected nations, the ban on pork 
imports, and the disbursement of the vaccine developed in the fall of 2010. Using 
news articles and government releases, I determined which of the four policies 
had been implemented, and on what date they began to affect the general public.   
There are 88 countries in the final data set, with weekly case reports for 
110 weeks, from 2009 to 2011. Missing data reports brings the total number of 
country-week observations to 8,144. 
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 Table 2 gives sample means for selected data variables.  The weighted 
column details the means of data observations, which is equivalent to weighting 
country means by their number of observations.  The un-weighted column gives 
country means. The difference in these means suggests bias on the proportion of 
observations recorded. 
  The mean weekly total of new H1N1 cases for country-weeks in the 
dataset is 129, with a standard deviation of 553. The mean population (weighted 
by number of observations) of countries in the dataset is 93 million, and the mean 
gross domestic product (again weighted) is 70.6. 
 Thirteen percent of the observations in the dataset are from Africa, 22% 
are from Asia, 36% are from Europe, 15% are from North America, and 11% are 
from South America. The remaining 4% are located in Oceania.  Roughly 33% of 
the observations are from countries considered “very highly developed,” 28% are 
considered “highly developed,” and 36% are considered to be of “medium 
development.” 
 The data set has an overrepresentation of more economically developed, 
more populous countries, as the weighted means for these categories exceed the 
unweighted. Unfortunately, data are not consistently available for less populous 
and less developed countries. Furthermore, 27% of countries in the dataset are in 
Asia, but only 22% of observations.  There is an overrepresentation of countries 
in Europe and North America, suggesting that there was more consistent data 
reporting in these regions. These biases limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this analysis. 
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 In general, the warmer countries in the sample tended to have fewer 
weekly cases than cooler countries, consistent within subgroups of similar tourism 
and also within subgroups by pandemic policy selection (Tables 3 and 4).  
Countries choosing to ban flights to Mexico or to ban pork had a similar level of 
average weekly cases, between 144 and 149 new cases of H1N1 per week. 
Countries vaccinating or using thermal scanners had a somewhat lower average 
weekly caseload, between 124 and 129 new cases of H1N1 per week. More 
tourism also correlates with a higher average weekly caseload, both overall and 
within temperature subgroups.  
 As seen in Table 5, increases in population or tourism have a 
corresponding increase in average weekly new cases, as does the combination of 
the two factors (with the exception of the most populous, lowest tourism countries 
which have a lower weekly caseload than median population, lowest tourism 
countries). However, the interaction of temperature and population is less exact—
for a given population level, countries with median temperatures have the highest 
weekly caseload, followed by the coldest and then the warmest. For a given 
temperature level, countries with median populations generally had the lowest 
weekly caseload, followed by those with the smallest populations, and then by the 
most populous countries (Table 6). 
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IV. Estimation Strategy 
 The level of observation in this paper is each country
 
i in each week
 
t 
combining to form the unit country-week. The country data set includes 88 
countries from six continents, with a variety of social, cultural, and economic 
backgrounds. The sample was selected for consistent tracking of data, range of 
treatments, and a documented presence of H1N1. The data set tracks new 
Pandemic H1N1 Influenza cases in these countries over a period of approximately 
two years, from the spring of 2009 to the winter of 2011. Cases are those reported 
to the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) and may represent an 
underestimate of total cases. However, I assume that this underreporting is 
relatively consistent across nations and weeks, and any country-correlated 
variations in reporting are adjusted for by the inclusion of seasonal influenza 
(Influenza A and B) data (also reported to WHO). 
 This paper assumes that new H1N1 influenza cases in each country-week 
are a function of observable baseline characteristics, known policy measures, and 
unobservable characteristics, first represented in a linear model as: 
Casesit= α + β1Xit + β2Treatmentit + β3LagCasesit  +vit 
The baseline characteristics included are country-specific, and address a range of 
social, cultural, and economic factors that would likely influence the progress of 
an influenza pandemic within its borders. These characteristics include the World 
Development Index ranking, population, seasonal influenza cases (A & B), 
geographic location, and overall climate.  
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 Because of the event-probability nature of the data, this paper also 
includes two Poisson models—one structured specifically for panel data, and one 
structured as a regular Poisson model with robust standard errors.  The Poisson 
models use the same set of variables as the OLS model with the exception of 
country fixed effects, as the model failed to converge with country fixed effects 
included.  Therefore the preferred specification suggests that the count of cases in 
a given country
 
i in a given week
 
t is a function of a vector of baseline 
characteristics for each country i, a vector of the time trend for each week t (week 
fixed effects) and a vector of policy interventions with an associated country and 
week of implementation.  While the dispersion of the data may not perfectly fit 
the Poisson model of equivalent conditional means and standard deviations, the 
use of counts as an outcome variable makes the Poisson probability model 
appropriate. 
 The treatments tested in this model are all preventative and containment 
treatments, not palliative or curative. When H1N1 was first detected in Mexico, 
19 countries in the sample chose to restrict flights to and from Mexico (some also 
restricted travel to and from the U.S.). Thirty-four nations in the sample installed 
thermal scanning machines in their airports, monitoring human body temperature 
with infrared technology. Fifty-five nations in the sample disbursed the H1N1 
vaccine developed in September of 2009, though some nations started vaccination 
campaigns later in the pandemic. Lastly, eleven nations chose to ban the import of 
all pigs and pork from nations where H1N1 had been confirmed. Each treatment 
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in each country has an associated implementation date, and lags for each 
treatment are included to capture any delay in the policy’s effect. 
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V. Results 
I. Origins of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
As seen in Figure 2, there is no clear pattern between development 
(measured by the United Nations Human Development Program rating) and the 
start date of the pandemic by continent.  
One might assume that the development of a country is actually a proxy 
for international inflows like tourism, but a comparison with continent and 
tourism interactions shows a relationship between high tourism and earlier start 
dates, suggesting something endogenous to development or tourism is the true 
cause (Figure 3).  As Figure 4 shows, countries with higher development ratings 
and higher tourism tended to have an earlier start date, consistent for countries of 
high and median tourism.  For countries with low tourism, however, there seems 
to be no relationship between levels of development and start date.  This supports 
the theory that tourism was the main method of transmission between countries 
(as a start date of the pandemic suggests a new transmission), but for countries 
with low tourism, a bundle of endogenous effects, such as geographic location, 
was the main determinant. 
Mexico, located in North America, was the point of origin for the 
pandemic, and it next moved to the United States (Global Health Atlas). Among 
countries with high and very high development, countries in North America were 
the first to report cases of swine flu, followed by Asia and South America. The 
less developed (medium rating) countries of North America reported cases only 
after the virus had moved to Asia and South America. Countries of medium 
development in Africa report the virus around the same time as less developed 
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countries in Asia, while countries in Europe were the last to get swine flu. 
Visualizations of the distribution of start dates are given in Figure 5 (non-
cumulative) and Figure 6 (cumulative). 
Temperature hypothetically could have two types of effect on the flu 
experience.  First, warmer countries likely have more tourism, thus serving as a 
proxy for an increased number of incoming travelers, bringing H1N1 influenza to 
the country earlier. In addition, colder climates may force people to spend more 
time indoors, reducing person-to-person transmission. The interactions of 
temperature and tourism by continent are detailed in Table 7. While warmer 
countries in Asia experienced less tourism overall, countries in North Africa, 
Europe, North America, and South America demonstrated a positive relationship 
between temperature and tourism, supporting the proxy hypothesis.  
Looking at the interactions between temperature and tourism, there is no 
consistent effect across temperature and tourism groupings.  However, for a given 
temperature (excluding those of median temperature), having more tourism 
correlates with an earlier start date to the pandemic (Table 9).   
 
II. The Pandemic Experience 
One would assume that the number of cases in a given week was 
determined by a combination of factors endogenous to the country and the time, 
as well as exogenous factors like the previous number of cases. Because influenza 
is transmitted person-to-person, some existing number of cases is necessary to 
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cause more cases, with the exception of travel’s contribution to international 
disease. Table 1 details the model of each of these factors.  
Specifically, the model includes dummy variables for each continent 
(Oceania excluded), dummy variables for each category of the United Nations 
Human Development Program Human Development Index (low development 
omitted, medium development excluded because of collinearity), a one week 
lagged indicator of new H1N1 cases, time variables for each year-month 
combination and individual calendar months, and demographic variables for 
population, gross domestic product, annual tourism counts (2008), and annual 
reported seasonal influenza cases (types A and B, 2008). 
Although the coefficient on the lag of new cases is small, this regressor 
explains 45% of the variation in “now” weekly cases.  Adding in the controls 
increases the explanatory power of the model to 60%.  The positive (and 
significant) coefficient on the lag of new cases suggests that existing cases will 
cause new weekly cases, continuing the pandemic in the absence of exogenous 
influence. 
 
III. Policy Interventions 
As soon as the epidemic was announced, countries began to prepare for its 
arrival—or to attempt to prevent it. Four policies are analyzed in this paper—
thermal scanning at airports to detect and quarantine those with elevated body 
temperatures, restrictions on flights coming from countries with H1N1 influenza, 
banning the import of pork, and providing vaccines to the general public. 
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Policy selection varied across levels of development, as seen in Figure 7.  
More than three quarters of the most developed nations chose to have mass 
vaccination campaigns, while less than 10% of them chose to enact bans on pork 
imports.  Conversely, while about half of the countries of medium development 
held vaccination campaigns, 20% banned pork, 25% banned flights, and half of 
them used thermal imaging cameras at points of entry.   
Figure 8 shows how policy selection varied across regions.  All countries 
in Oceania used vaccines and thermal imaging.  In Europe, about three quarters of 
countries held vaccination campaigns, while few supported flight bans, pork bans, 
or thermal imaging.  Countries in Africa were the least likely to vaccinate, with 
about 30% of countries choosing to do so, while more than 40% installed thermal 
imaging cameras at points of entry.  The only countries to ban the import of pork 
were located in Europe and Asia, primarily in the Middle East. 
Pork import bans and flight bans were the first policies to take effect, as 
countries implementing these policies instituted them by the fourth week of the 
epidemic. Thermal scanners were already in place in several countries in Asia 
because of the SARS and H5N1 pandemics, and other countries adopted them by 
the eighth week of the epidemic. However, the vaccine was not developed until 
the fall of 2009, about 28 weeks after the beginning of the epidemic. Some 
countries did not make the vaccine available for mass distribution until several 
months later. The average country rated as “Very High” development started its 
vaccination program at the beginning of November, while the average country 
with “High” development started its vaccination program at the very end of 2009. 
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Countries with “Medium” development didn’t begin vaccination until the 
beginning of January in 2010, two months later than those with “Very High” 
development (see Table 11 for details). 
Table 12 gives the results of the ordinary least squares regression with 
increasing levels of controls.  In column 7, the preferred specification estimates 
that countries in which vaccination has begun experience approximately 26 fewer 
H1N1 cases per week than peer nations, significant at the .01 level.  All other 
policies yield positive coefficients, suggesting that these policies actually increase 
the incidence of swine flu.  Whether these coefficients are representative of 
underlying correlation, or of overconfidence in the policy eroding base prevention 
techniques (like handwashing) remains to be proved. However, none of these 
coefficients are significant at the .05 or .01 level.  The set of controls and policies 
in column 7 explain 88% of the variation in weekly swine flu cases. 
Tables 13 and 14 detail the results of a similarly structured Poisson 
regression.  Table 13 is a standard Poisson regression with robust standard errors, 
and table 14 is panel Poisson model (using country and week as panel 
dimensions).  As in the OLS model, we see a statistically significant reductive 
effect from vaccination, while the other three policies yield positive (significant 
and insignificant) coefficients. 
 
IV. Comparison of Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Experience 
In August of 2010, The United Nations World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared that the H1N1 pandemic had moved to the post-pandemic 
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period.  WHO characterized the post-pandemic period as one in which the H1N1 
strain would exhibit seasonal influenza patterns, contrasted with the high infection 
rates among the young and healthy during traditionally low influenza times of 
year seen during the pandemic period. 
Looking at cases before (April 2009 to August 2010) and after (August 
2010 to March 2011) this formal conclusion, we see that most subgroups (by 
climate, demographic, and geographic controls) experienced roughly a 60% 
decline in weekly new cases of H1N1 (Table 15). However, countries in Europe 
experienced a much more shallow decline in weekly cases, dropping 16% (from 
65 cases/week to 55 cases/week). Countries in North and South America, by 
contrast, experienced a more dramatic decline, with countries in North America 
dropping 88% (from 322 cases/week to 40 cases/week) and countries in South 
America dropping 98% (from 109 cases/week to 2 cases/week).  We also observe 
a smaller decline in cases among countries with lower populations, dropping 39% 
(from 24 cases/week to 14 cases/week), but the regional differences are the most 
profound.  
   24 
VI. Conclusion 
While vaccination appears to be an effective intervention in reducing 
H1N1 cases, more research is needed to fully disentangle these effects from 
country-based differences (as noted by the varying implementation dates among 
countries of different development levels).  Future research should also examine 
policy effects on morbidity—does vaccination only affect weekly infections, or 
also the severity of those infections?  If a measure of a country’s “pandemic end” 
can be developed, it would be useful to compare the lengths of pandemic 
experienced by different countries and compare that with the policies introduced.  
It may be that containment policies such thermal scanning and flight bans don’t 
affect weekly caseloads, but do impact the initial date of the pandemic and the 
length of the pandemic. 
This paper also highlights the need for more consistent accounting of 
international disease.  While many countries did consistently report H1N1 cases 
to the World Health Organization (WHO), biases in the level of reporting and 
frequency of reporting limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the WHO’s 
data. In the case of future pandemics, this study should be repeated with more 
consistent and representative data to fully determine the effects of baseline 
characteristics and policy interventions on pandemic outcomes. 
   25 
Citations 
 
“$200 million spent on swine flu pandemic.” ABC News Australia, January 8, 
2011.  Accessed April 26, 2011. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/01/08/3108766.htm 
“A public health lesson from 9/11: To curb the flu, limit flights.” Children’s 
Hospital Boston, September 11, 2006. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.childrenshospital.org/newsroom/Site1339/mainpageS1339P1s
ublevel232.html 
“Asia-Pacific on High Alert as Swine Flu Fears Intensify.” Voice of America 
News, April 29, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-04-29-voa8-
68799312.html 
“The cost of swine flu.” The Economist, July 27, 2009.  Accessed April 19, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/14115951 
“FACTBOX: Economics costs of a flu pandemic.“ Reuters, April 25, 2009. 
Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53O0WO20090425 
“FACTBOX-Latest measures to fight H1N1 swine flu in Europe.” Reuters, 
December 9, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSGEE5B81HR 
“FACTBOX-Measures against new flu in Europe.” Reuters, May 9, 2009. 
Accessed April 6, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL3238817 
“FACTBOX-Measures to fight H1N1 swine flu in Europe .” Reuters, November 
25, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AO1JV20091125 
“HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan.”  U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, November 2005. 
“Impact of Swine Flu: Could swine flu tip the world into deflation?” Oxford 
Economics, June 22, 2009.  Accessed April 19, 2011. 
www.oxfordeconomics.com/free/pdfs/swineflu(jun09).pdf 
“International Visitor Arrivals,” World Travel & Tourism Council. Accessed 
April 6, 2011. 
http://www.wttc.org/eng/Tourism_Research/Economic_Data_Search_Tool 
“National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.” Homeland Security Council, 
November 2005. 
   26 
“Q&A: Swine flu.” BBC News, April 27, 2009. Accessed April 11, 2011. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8017585.stm 
“Swine flu ‘cannot be contained.’” BBC, July 2, 2009. Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8130097.stm 
“Swine flu cases approach 600 in Turkey.” Today’s Zaman, October 21, 2009. 
Accessed April 10, 2011. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-
190542-swine-flu-cases-approach-600-in-turkey.html 
“Temperature Screening for Travelers.” Meditherm, Inc. Accessed April 11, 
2011. http://www.meditherm.com/fever_screening.htm 
“The world response to flu crisis.” British Broadcasting Channel, May 5, 2009. 
Accessed April 6, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8022516.stm 
“World: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 affected countries and deaths.” World Health 
Organization.  Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/ 
Amico, Chris. “How Much Will the H1N1 Flu Cost the U.S.?” PBS Online 
Newshour, October 8, 2009.  Accessed April 26, 2011. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/health/july-dec09/flu-costs_10-
08.html 
Associated Press. “Swine flu casts shadow over global economy.” MSNBC, April 
27, 2009. Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30436341/ 
Batty, David. “Swine flu: Government set to abandon daily recording of new 
cases.” The Guardian, July 2, 2009. Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/02/swine-flu-collating-
information-government 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “CDC Briefing on Public Health 
Investigation of Human Cases of Swine Influenza.” April 24, 2009. 
Accessed April 11, 2011. 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090424.htm 
Global Health Atlas. “Communicable Diseases: Influenza virus monitoring.” 
World Health Organization.  Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp 
Global Research. “The Worldwide H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic.” Global 
Research, August 4, 2009. Accessed April 11, 2011. 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14629 
Hawkes, Nigel. “Flu deaths: a triumph of statistics, not virology.” Straight 
Statistics, July 5, 2010. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
   27 
http://www.straightstatistics.org/article/flu-deaths-triumph-statistics-not-
virology 
Hine, Dame Deirdre.  “The 2009 Influenza Pandemic.”  July 2010. 
Ioffe, Julia. “Ukraine’s phantom flu.” Foreign Policy, November 25, 2009. 
Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/ukraines_phantom_flu 
Kliff, Sarah. “When Flu Flies.” Newsweek, April 27, 2009. Accessed April 6, 
2011. http://www.newsweek.com/2009/04/26/when-flu-flies.html 
Landau, Elizabeth. “CDC: Swine flu viruses in U.S. and Mexico match.” CNN, 
April 25, 2009. Accessed April 11, 2011. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/24/swine.flu/index.html 
McKay, Peter, and Carolyn Cui. “Flu Outbreak Depresses Markets.” Wall Street 
Journal, April 28, 2009. Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124082918450558901.html 
Murray, Christopher J.L., Alan D. Lopez, and Suqit Wibulpolprasert. “Monitoring 
global health: time for new solutions.” BMJ, November 4, 2004. 
http://www.bmj.com/content/329/7474/1096.full?ijkey=ece5939416cadac
d352ee292992a488cf3a37981&keytype2=tf_ipsecsha 
Smith, Michael. “Flu Shot Targets Should Be Kids, Parents.” ABC News, August 
20, 2009. Accessed April 10, 2011. 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/SwineFlu/story?id=8374106 
Steinhardt, Bernice. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, Committee on Homeland 
Security, and House of Representatives, September 26, 2007. 
Voigt, Kevin. “Pandemic equals economic pain.” CNN, April 28, 2009. Accessed 
April 10, 2011. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/04/27/pandemic.economy/index.h
tml 
Walsh, Brian. “Judging the WHO’s Reaction to the H1N1 Flu Threat.” Time, May 
11, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1897547,00.html#ixzz0z
NOudl1i 
Whatley, Stuart. “Swine Flu’s Potential Economic Effects: Mexico’s Tourism, 
Retail Sure to Suffer.” Huffington Post, April 28, 2009. Accessed April 
10, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/28/swine-flus-
potential-econ_n_192292.html 
   28 
World Health Organization. “H1N1 in post-pandemic period.” August 10, 2010. 
Accessed April 11, 2011. 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/h1n1_vpc_201008
10/en/index.html 
Yang, Fang. “Countries step up safety measures as swine flu cases rise.” China 
View, April 27, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2011. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/27/content_11267836.htm 
   A-1 
Tables and Figures
 
Table 1: Deaths by Respiratory Pandemic 
Pandemic (Year) Deaths 
SARS (2003) 916 
H1N1 (2009-11) 14,286 
H3N2 (1968-9) 1,000,000 
H2N2 (1956-8) 2,000,000 
 
Fig. 1: H1N1 Influenza Cases and Deaths
 
Table 2: Sample Means of Selected Variables 
  Weighted Unweighted 
Weekly New Cases 129 -- 
Population 93,000,000 61,600,000 
GDP 71 68.48 
Africa 0.13 0.14 
Asia 0.22 0.27 
Europe 0.36 0.32 
North America 0.15 0.13 
South America 0.11 0.11 
Oceania 0.04 0.03 
Very High Development 0.33 0.32 
High Development 0.28 0.31 
Medium Development 0.36 0.35 
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Table 3: Mean Weekly New Cases by Temperature and Tourism 
 Less tourism to More tourism All 
Cooler 22.56 54.25 153.75 87.76 
to 10.47 39.36 331.65 162.38 
Warmer 5.71 27 57.1 23.76 
 
Table 4: Mean Weekly New Cases by Policy and Temperature 
 Pork Vaccine Flight Thermo 
All 149.37 124.11 144.06 128.81 
Cooler 228.84 101.94 250.63 292.44 
to 154.2 227.82 126.18 193.96 
Warmer 33.28 37.48 29.13 32.95 
 
Table 5: Mean Weekly New Cases by Population and Tourism 
 Lowest Population to Highest Population 
All 21.5 49.73 184.33 
Less Tourism 12.62 16.96 6.99 
to 30.87 33.57 46.85 
More Tourism 40.31 123.89 272.67 
 
Table 6: Mean Weekly New Cases by Temperature and Population 
 Lowest Population to Highest Population 
All 21.5 49.73 184.33 
Cooler 24.79 94.7 203.51 
to 37.06 30.77 291.35 
Warmer 14.57 9.43 39.12 
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Fig. 2:  Pandemic Start Date by Continent and Development
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Fig. 3: Pandemic Start Date by Continent and Tourism
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Fig. 4: Pandemic Start Date by Development and Tourism
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Fig. 5: Week of First H1N1 Case (World)
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Fig. 6: H1N1 Positive Countries by Pandemic Week
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Table 7: Interactions of Temperature and Tourism by Continent  
(Temperature as Explanatory Variable) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Asia Africa Europe North America South America 
Temperature -175.9 176.1 1020.2 177.8 109.8 
  (21.8) (38.) (53.6) (45.5) (7.2) 
 
Table 8: Effect of Development & Tourism on Week of First H1N1 Case 
  Medium Development High Development Very High Development 
Least Tourism 29.8 22.3 37 
to 23.7 17.6 17.7 
Most Tourism 21.8 17.3 17 
 
Table 9: Effect of Tourism and Temperature on Week of First H1N1 Case 
  Least Tourism to Most Tourism 
Cooler 31.2 18.5 17.5 
to 26.6 18.1 19.7 
Warmer 31.8 22.7 17.5 
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H1N1 Policies by Pandemic Week
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Table 10: Poisson Estimates of Weekly New Cases (Robust SEs) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 Week Lag New Cases 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
       
Geographic Controls   Yes Yes 
       
Country Controls    Yes 
       
R2 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.60 
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Fig. 7: Policy Selection by Human Development Index
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Fig. 8: Policy Selection by Region
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Table 11: Vaccine Distribution by Human Development 
  Mean Date Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Very High 8-Nov-09 4-Nov-09 11-Nov-09 
High 30-Dec-09 26-Dec-09 3-Jan-10 
Medium 6-Jan-10 1-Jan-10 11-Jan-10 
 
Table 12: OLS Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases 
(Robust Std. Errors) 
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Vaccination Began? 29.11** -9.88* -15.61* -14.75* -18.27* -30.21* -26.42* 
  (12.4) (3.8) (4.5) (4.6) (5.3) (8.6) (9.0) 
Thermoscanning Began? 60.81* 3.97 4.85 0.87 7.11 12.01 2.40 
  (12.3) (4.4) (4.7) (5.5) (5.5) (8.9) (8.7) 
Flight Ban Began? 68.67* 5.94 0.44 -1.12 3.42 23.45 13.43 
  (14.9) (6.0) (6.2) (6.7) (8.0) (8.0) (7.6) 
Pork Ban Began? 69.29* 3.17 3.44 0.26 0.18 18.29 11.68 
  (20.9) (8.2) (6.5) (5.9) (7.8) (13.3) (13.1) 
          
1 Week Lagged New 
Cases  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls 
(Population, GDP, 
Tourism) 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic Controls 
(Continent)    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Influenza Propensity     Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects      Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effects       Yes 
          
R2 0.0149 0.8795 0.8800 0.8801 0.8796 0.8801 0.8823 
Obs 6431 6230 6163 6163 5184 5184 5184 
* Significant at the .01 level        
** Significant at the .05 level        
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Table 14: Panel Poisson Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases 
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vaccination Began? -0.73* -0.8* -0.8* -0.8* -0.81* -1.2* 
  (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) 
Thermoscanning Began? 2.45* 2.1* 2.1* 2.1* 2.19* 1.62* 
  (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) 
Flight Ban Began? 8.21* 7.86* 7.76* 7.68* 7.86* 6.94* 
  (.6) (.5) (.5) (.5) (.6) (.5) 
Pork Ban Began? 7.81* 7.34* 7.15* 7.09* 7.3* 6.08* 
  (.8) (.7) (.7) (.7) (.8) (.7) 
         
1 Week Lagged New Cases  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls 
(Population, GDP, Tourism)   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic Controls 
(Continent)    Yes Yes Yes 
Influenza Propensity     Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effects      Yes 
         
Log likelihood 
-
722989.48 -425504.04 -423244.92 -423241.68 -409159.06 -345656.98 
Obs 6431 6230 6163 6163 5184 5184 
* Significant at the .01 level       
 
Table 13: Poisson Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases  
(Robust Std. Errors) 
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vaccination Began? 0.29** -0.3* -0.7* -0.67* -0.71* -0.96* 
  (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Thermoscanning Began? 0.60* 0.58* 1.17* 1.15* 1.19* 1.02* 
  (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Flight Ban Began? 0.58* 0.44* 0.12 0.14 0.32** 0.12 
  (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Pork Ban Began? 0.55* 0.5* 0.17 0.24 0.27** 0.12 
  (.1) (.1) (.2) (.2) (.1) (.1) 
         
1 Week Lagged New Cases  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls (Population, 
GDP, Tourism) 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic Controls (Continent)    Yes Yes Yes 
Influenza Propensity     Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effects      Yes 
         
Pseudo R2 0.0631 0.5058 0.5935 0.6021 0.6015 0.6530 
Obs 6431 6230 6163 6163 5184 5184 
* Significant at the .01 level      
** Significant at the .05 level      
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Table 15: Mean Weekly New Cases During & Post-Pandemic 
  Pandemic Post-Pandemic % Decline 
All 108.55 41.05 -62% 
  (7.34) (4.07)   
Africa 25.06 12.17 -51% 
  (3.64) (3.41)   
Asia 135.19 52.58 -61% 
  (15.38) (10.5)   
Europe 65.27 54.91 -16% 
  (5.82) (7.19)   
North America 321.98 40.22 -88% 
  (40.91) (11.71)   
South America 108.55 1.87 -98% 
  (7.34) (.36)   
Very High Development 164.65 63.82 -61% 
  (16.62) (7.36)   
High Development 101.42 33.86 -67% 
  (12.38) (8.93)   
Medium Development 66.75 27.71 -58% 
  (8.59) (5.83)   
Low Tourism 16.1 6.76 -58% 
  (1.53) (.72)   
Med Tourism 46.54 10.23 -78% 
  (4.51) (1.21)   
High Tourism 246.19 98.16 -60% 
  (19.66) (10.71)   
Low Temperature 103.82 42.2 -59% 
  (11.72) (5.68)   
Med Temperature 191.33 71.53 -63% 
  (18.1) (10.96)   
High Temperature 28.49 9.66 -66% 
  (2.53) (1.85)   
Low GDP 77.67 29.36 -62% 
  (9.57) (6.31)   
Med GDP 78.65 28.07 -64% 
  (9.96) (7.07)   
High GDP 171.07 65.16 -62% 
  (17.28) (7.58)   
Low Population 23.65 14.45 -39% 
  (2.15) (1.6)   
Med Population 60.69 19.03 -69% 
  (9.54) (3.97)   
High Population 220.41 80.04 -64% 
  (17.59) (9.79)   
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Honors Summary 
 The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic was the basis for many fears, 
precautions, and policies. This paper seeks to discover the key determinants of 
each country’s pandemic experience—what factors influenced its arrival, its 
sustenance, and its eventual dissipation. The H1N1 pandemic ended in August of 
2010, but the virus still circulates in most of the world as part of the subtype A 
seasonal influenza. Study of this influenza pandemic may help prepare the world 
to take multilateral action against the next threat of outbreak. 
 I built my dataset of policy selections from news articles during the 
pandemic, checking which of the four policies (vaccination, thermal scanning, 
pork bans, and flight bans) were used in each of the 88 countries.  My weekly 
H1N1 case data come from the United Nations World Health Organization, and 
includes weekly reports for 110 weeks, from the spring of 2009 to spring of 2011. 
 In constructing a model that would predict the weekly caseload of each 
country I thought about how a pandemic functions.  Each country must have a 
point of contact that brings the virus to the country, as H1N1 influenza is 
contagious, not environmental. I used international visitor arrival data to construct 
a measure of tourism, and also included a variable for each continent to account 
for the increased likelihood of travel between nearby countries.  
 But travel alone would probably not be enough to determine how long the 
pandemic would last in a given country.  A country’s population, level of 
development, and a range of social factors would seem to determine the 
likelihood of the disease to spread within its borders.  I included population, gross 
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domestic product, and seasonal flu infection rates for each country to account for 
any baseline variation in susceptibility (like variations in personal space) or in 
reporting (as seasonal flu cases are reported via the same mechanism).  I also 
included a one-week lag of weekly new cases to account for the contagious nature 
of the disease—in the absence of travel, one must have old cases to cause new 
ones. Finally, I adjusted for country-specific trends and week-specific trends by 
using variables for fixed effects. 
 These factors gave me a model of predicted pandemic behavior.  However, 
these factors predicted that the pandemic would continue much longer than it did.  
Adding the policy variables to the model, it appears that mass vaccination 
campaigns had a significant effect in reducing the average weekly caseload, and 
given the widespread adoption of this policy, it likely had an effect in speeding 
the end of the pandemic.  The policy variables are coded as “has it happened yet,” 
meaning that the regression model looks at each country-week combination, and 
compares it with the set of policy dates and countries.  For a country that began 
vaccinating during the 43rd week of the pandemic, all observations (weeks of data 
from that country) from weeks 44 on will be coded as “yes” (in reality, “1”), 
allowing the model to generate a coefficient for the effect on weekly cases of 
being in a week in a country where vaccines have been distributed, compared to a 
week in that country before the policy was implemented and to weeks in other 
countries not implementing this policy. 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression works by identifying the unique 
effects of each variable on the regressor of interest, in this case, weekly new cases.  
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For example, more populous nations may tend to have higher GDPs, causing 
these two variables to affect new cases in a similar way.  OLS kicks out the 
shared effects, and creates a coefficient based on specifically having the attribute 
of the variable.  The coefficient is the expected change in weekly new cases based 
on a one-unit change in the variable.  As the policies are coded in a binary form, 
their coefficients are the effects of having the policy in place. 
 A Poisson regression takes a slightly different approach.  This model 
assumes that the count presented in the dependent variable is a function of 
independent vectors.  My model uses three such vectors—one for a country’s 
baseline characteristics, one for a given week’s expected impact (week fixed 
effects), and one for the policies’ expected impact, based on country and on week.  
The coefficient on a Poisson regression is interpreted as the natural log of the 
change in weekly cases corresponding with a one-unit difference in the vector 
predictor.  As the policy variables are still coded in a binary form, their 
coefficients are the effects of having the policy in place, rather than a gradient-
like spectrum of effects. 
 I also used sample means from my data set to determine the effect of 
various demographic and geographic factors on the arrival of the pandemic in a 
given country.  In general, warmer countries with the most tourism and the 
highest level of development had the earliest start to the pandemic.  However, 
geographic factors also played a role.  Countries in North and South America had 
the earliest reporting of cases, while countries in Asia and Africa experienced a 
much later start to the pandemic.   
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 Finally, I was curious about the effects of being in a “post-pandemic” period 
compared with a pandemic period, and wanted to see if I could find representation 
of what caused WHO to change its description.  While panels C and D of figure 1 
provides some insights into the stabilization of the situation, I wanted to 
numerically compared the April 2009 to August 2010 period with the August 
2010 to March 2011 period. 
These results are presented in table 15. I found that most subgroups (by 
climate, demographic, and geographic controls) experienced roughly a 60% 
decline in weekly new cases of H1N1 (Table 15). However, countries in Europe 
experienced a much more shallow decline in weekly cases, dropping 16% (from 
65 cases/week to 55 cases/week). Countries in North and South America 
experienced a more dramatic decline, with countries in North America dropping 
88% (from 322 cases/week to 40 cases/week) and countries in South America 
dropping 98% (from 109 cases/week to 2 cases/week). 
This may be due to the different start dates among the three continents—
North and South America’s pandemic may have been nearing an end earlier in 
2010 while Europe’s later start date may have pushed the height of the pandemic 
later.  However, further research into the “life cycle” of pandemics is required to 
fully understand these and the policy effects. 
 
